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Abstract. There are three questions associated with Simpson’s paradox
(SP): (i) Why is SP paradoxical? (ii) What conditions generate SP? and
(iii) How to proceed when confronted with SP? An adequate analysis
of the paradox starts by distinguishing these three questions. Then, by
developing a formal account of SP, and substantiating it with a counter-
example to causal accounts, we argue that there are no causal factors at
play in answering questions (i) and (ii). Causality enters only in connec-
tion with action.
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1 Overview
In his recent book, Saving Truth from Paradox, Hartry Field discusses the philo-
sophical significance of paradoxes. According to him, “[a]ny resolution of the
paradoxes will involve giving up (or at least restricting) some very firmly held
principles:... [and] [t]he principles to be given up, are the ones to which the aver-
age person simply can’t conceive of alternatives. That’s why the paradoxes are
paradoxes.” [4, p.17]. Their significance and the firmly held principles which we
have to give up in resolving them is a recurring theme in philosophical logic.
We will illustrate this in the case of Simpson’s paradox (SP), which involves the
reversal of the direction of a comparison or the cessation of an association when
data from several groups are combined to form a single whole [17]. At least three
distinct questions are important in understanding the nature of the paradox: (i)
Why or in what sense, is SP a paradox? (ii) What are the conditions in which
the paradox arises? (iii) How should one proceed when confronted with a typi-
cal case of the paradox, hereafter to be called the “what-to-do” question?1 The
three questions are distinct: answering one of them does not entail answers to the
1 Daniel Hausman was perhaps the first philosopher who drew our attention to the
significance of these three types of questions (in an email communication).
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others. Following these three questions, we distinguish two types of truth about
SP: the first-level truth and the second-level truth. The significance of the three
questions about the paradox is what we call the “first-level truth”, while the
significance of the first two questions in unlocking its paradoxical nature and
the conditions for its emergence is what we call the “second-level truth.” The
failure to appreciate the difference between these two levels of truth, we will
contend, is the source of its misdiagnosis. Tables 1 and 2 illustrate the two types
of SP. The data in both tables represent acceptance and rejection rates of male
and female applicants for graduate school in two departments of an imaginary
university in some year.
Table 1. Simpson’s Paradox (Type I)
Two
Groups




Accept Reject Accept Reject Dept 1 Dept 2
Females 180 20 100 200 90% 33% 56%
Males 480 120 10 90 80% 10% 70%
Table 2. Simpson’s Paradox (Type II)
Two
Groups




Accept Reject Accept Reject Dept 1 Dept 2
Females 90 1410 110 390 6% 22% 10%
Males 20 980 380 2620 2% 13% 10%
Table 1 represents an example of the paradox in which the association in the
sub-populations (Dept 1 and Dept 2) with higher acceptance rate for females is
reversed in the combined population, with overall higher rates for males. Table 2
is an example that shows the paradoxical effect when the association between
“gender” and “acceptance rates” in the sub-populations ceases to exist in the
combined population. Though the acceptance rates for females are higher in each
department, in the combined population, those rates cease to be different.
This paper is divided into eight sections. In section two, we will propose our re-
sponsetothefirsttwoquestions.Thenwewillbriefly introducetwoinfluential causal
accounts of SP proposed independently by Judea Pearl [9] andPeter Spirtes, Clark
Glymour andRichardScheines (hereafter called ‘SGS’) [15]. In section four, wewill
produce a counter-example to the causal accounts.The next sectionwill be devoted
to the “what-to-do”question. In section six, we evaluate causal accounts (with spe-
cial attention to Pearl’s) of the paradox and compare them with ours. In section
seven, we will discuss how our account affects the general notion of paradoxes and
their classification while providing a general definition of a paradox. We conclude
with some remarks in section eight.
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2 Formal Analysis of SP
2.1 Conditions of SP2
We begin with an analysis of the paradox in response to question (ii), “what
are the conditions in which the paradox arises?” Consider two groups, [A, B],
taken to be mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive. The overall rates for each
group are [α, β] respectively. Each group is partitioned into categories [1, 2] and
the rates within each partition are [A1, A2, B1, B2]. Let’s assume that f1 = the
number of females accepted in D1, F1 = the total number of females applied
to D1, m1 = the number of males accepted in D1, M1 = the total number of
males applied to D1. Then A1 = f1/F1, and B1 = m1/M1. Defining f2, F2, m2
and M2 in a similar way, we get A2 = f2/F2 and B2 = m2/M2. Likewise, we
could understand α and β as representing the overall rates for females and males,
respectively. So the terms α = (f1+f2)/(F1+F2) and β = (m1+m2)/(M1+M2).
To help conceptualize these notations in terms of Table 1, we provide their
corresponding numerical values: A1 = 180/200 = 90%, A2 = 100/300 = 33%,
B1 = 480/600 = 80%, B2 = 10/100 = 10%, α = 280/500 = 56%, and finally
β = 490/700 = 70%. Since α, β, A1, A2, B1, and B2 are rates of some form,
they will range between 0 and 1 inclusive. We further stipulate the following
definitions where, “≡” means “is defined as”.
C1 ≡ A1 ≥ B1.
C2 ≡ A2 ≥ B2.
C3 ≡ β ≥ α.
C ≡ (C1&C2&C3).
In terms of Table 1, these definitions become C1: 90% > 80%, C2: 33% > 10%,
C3: 70% > 56% and thus C is satisfied. But C alone is not a sufficient condition
for SP. We could have a case where A1 = B1, A2 = B2 and β = α resulting in
no paradox, yet C being satisfied. Hence, we stipulate another definition:
C4 ≡ θ > 0.
where, θ = (A1 −B1) + (A2 −B2) + (β − α).
For the data in Table 1, θ equals 10% + 23% + 14%. Again, C4 alone is
not sufficient for SP since we could have a case where A1 > B1, B2 > A2 and
β > α resulting in no paradox (C is violated) and yet C4 being satisfied.
3 Hence,
2 Some parts of this section are based on our previous work [1,2].
3 As a heuristic rule we take A1 to be that sub-group ratio which is the greater of
the two ratios and B1 as that which is the lesser of the two. In table 1, the ratio
of women admitted to department 1 is greater than that of men. Hence, the former
will be taken as A1 and the latter will be taken as B1. Similarly, since the ratio of
women admitted to department 2 is greater than that of men, the former is taken
as A2 and the latter as B2. This avoids the complexity of taking the absolute value
of their difference in the calculation of θ.
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a situation is a case of SP if and only if:
C ≡ (C1&C2&C3) (a)
C4 ≡ θ = (A1 −B1) + (A2 −B2) + (β − α) > 04 (b)
Both (a) and (b) are necessary conditions, but they jointly constitute sufficient
conditions for generating SP [1].5 Both conditions for the paradox generate two
key theorems which specify the relationship between the two acceptance rates
in both sub-populations. These are: 1. A1 = A2, and 2. B1 = B2. Table 3 shows
why the condition for Theorem 1 needs to hold. Since A1 = A2, i.e., 25% = 25%,
no paradox results. Similarly, in Table 4, since B1 = B2, i.e., 25% = 25%, the
paradox does not occur. Proofs of these theorems are provided in the appendix.
Table 3. No SP (A1 = A2)
Two
Groups




Accept Reject Accept Reject Dept 1 Dept 2
Females 75 225 75 225 25% 25% 25%
Males 10 90 20 80 10% 20% 15%
Table 4. No SP (B1 = B2)
Two
Groups




Accept Reject Accept Reject Dept 1 Dept 2
Females 10 90 20 80 10% 20% 15%
Males 75 225 75 225 25% 25% 25%
There are four points worth mentioning. First, Clark Glymour [5] would call our
account an application of the “Socratic method” in which we provide necessary
and sufficient conditions for the analysis of a concept.6 Second, the character-
ization of the puzzle in terms of our two conditions captures the paradoxical
4 See Blyth [3] for similar conditions. However, our conditions and notations are
slightly different from his.
5 See [6], [16]. The latter paper shows that SP reversal involves Boolean disjunction
of events in an algebra rather than being restricted to cells of a partition.
6 Glymour contrasts this method with what he calls the “Euclidean”-method based
theories where one could derive interesting consequences from them although
Euclidean-method based theories, according to him, are invariably incomplete. It
is interesting to note two very different points. First, although Glymour is not fond
of the Socratic-method on which, however, a large part of the western philosophical
tradition rests, our Socratic-method based logical account at the same time is also
able to generate some interesting logical consequences (See [1,2]). Second, it is not
only the Greeks who applied this method. In classical Indian philosophical tradi-
tion, the Socratic method is also very much prevalent where a definition of a term
is evaluated in terms of whether it is able to escape from being both “too narrow”
and “too wide.”
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nature of the data in the examples given, namely, the reversal or the cessation of
an association in the overall population; they are in no way ad hoc. Third, the
paradox is “structural” in character, in the sense that the reasoning that leads
to it is deductive. Consider our examples, which involve simple arithmetic. The
overall rates of acceptance for both females and males follow from their rates of
acceptance in two departments taken separately. Note that both conditions of
the paradox can be defined in terms of the probability theory, which is purely
deductive [3]. Fourth, unless someone uses the notion of causation trivially, for
example, believes that 2+2 “causes” 4, there is no reason to assume that there
are causal intuitions lurking in the background. We will return to the last point
in greater detail in the following sections.
2.2 Why is SP “Paradoxical”?
To answer question (i), “why is SP a paradox?” we now provide an explanation of
how the paradox arises in people’s minds and why it is found perplexing. In other
words, what is the reasoning that the “average person” follows that leads him/her
to a paradoxical conclusion? For our purposes, we have reconstructed our type
I version of SP in terms of its premises and conclusion to show how the paradox
arises. However, the point of the reconstruction will be adequately general to
be applicable to all types of SP. We introduce a numerical principle called the
collapsibility principle (CP) which plays a crucial role in the reconstruction. CP
says that relationships between variables that hold in the sub-populations (e.g.,
the rate of acceptance of females being higher than the rate of acceptance of
males in both sub-populations) must hold in the overall population as well (i.e.,
the rate of acceptance of females must be higher than the rate of acceptance of
males in the population). There are two versions of CP corresponding to the two
types of SP represented by Tables 1 and 2. The first version of CP (CP1) says
that a dataset is collapsible if and only if [(A1 > B1)&(A2 > B2) → (α > β)].
The second version of CP (CP2) states that a dataset is collapsible if and only if
[(A1 = B1)&(A1 = B2) → (α = β)]. That CP1 and CP2 can lead to paradoxical
results demonstrates that both versions of the principle are not, in all their
applications, true. That is, CP → ∼SP, whether it is CP1 or CP2, where “→”
is to be construed as the implication sign. If f1, F2, m1, M2, A1, A2, B1, B2,
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As we can see, CP is a numerical inference principle devoid of any causal
intuition. Here is the reconstruction of type I version of SP:
(1) Female and male populations are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive;
one can’t be a student of both departments and satisfy the two conditions of SP.
(2) The acceptance rate of females is higher than that of males in Department
1. (observed from data)
(3) The acceptance rate of females is higher than that of males in Department
2. (observed from data)
(4) If (2) and (3) are true, then the acceptance rate for females is higher than
that of males overall. (from CP1)
(5) Hence the acceptance rate for females is higher than that of males overall.
(from (2), (3) and (4))
(6) However, fewer females are admitted overall. (observed from data)
(7) Overall acceptance rate for females is both higher and lower than that of
males. (from (5) and (6))
In our derivation of the paradox, premise (4) plays a crucial role. In type I
version of SP, as given in Table 1, CP1 does not hold (A1 > B1 and A2 > B2,
but α < β). That CP1 is not generally true is shown by our derivation of a
contradiction. The same result can be obtained for Type II version of SP in
Table 2 where CP2 has to be given up if the paradox is to be avoided.
Our answer to the first question, (i), then, is simply that humans tend to
invoke CP uncritically, as a rule of thumb, and thereby make mistakes in certain
cases about proportions and ratios; they find it paradoxical when their usual
expectation that CP is applicable across the board, turns out to be incorrect.
And the reason we think people invoke CP uncritically, is its remarkable (formal)
resemblance with the two inference rules given below.7
1. In elementary algebra, the following truth holds for real numbers:
x1 > y1
x2 > y2
∴ (x1 + x2) > (y1 + y2)
While it is correct to substitute A1(f1/F1) for x1, B1(m1/M1) for y1, A2(f2/F2)
for x2 and B2(m2/M2) for y2, people might confuse (x1 + x2) and (y1 + y2) for
α((f1 + f2)/(F1 +F2)) and β((m1 +m2)/(M1 +M2)) respectively, leading them
to think that CP is also a mathematical truth. Thus, mistakes about proportions
and ratios could lead the average person to see a superficial resemblance between
CP and the above mathematical truth.
2. In propositional logic, the following rule is valid:
P1 → Q (A)
P2 → Q (B)
∴ (P1 ∨ P2) → Q (C)
7 We are thankful to Joseph Hanna and John G. Bennett for helpful emails on this
point.
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In our case, let P1 = “A student applies to Department 1”, P2 = “A student
applies to Department 2” and Q = “The student has greater chance of being
accepted, if the gender of the student is female”. Now, (A) partially captures
the condition A1 > B1 whereas (B) partially captures A2 > B2. (C), which
reads, “If a student applied to Department 1 or Department 2 then, the student
has greater chance of being accepted if the gender of the student is female” re-
sembles the condition α > β. We do not suggest that propositional logic can
capture the essence of the paradox. The reasoning leading to SP involves proba-
bilistic considerations which, unlike propositional logic, is not truth-functional.
For example, the probability of a disjunction is not a function of the probability
of its disjuncts. Likewise, SP is a weighted average of probabilities, or, in other
words, averages of averages. No such concept of weighted average exists in truth-
functional logic. The above comparison of CP with a valid propositional rule no
more than suggests why people tend to use CP even in cases where it leads to
contradiction.
3 Causal Accounts of SP
3.1 Pearl’s Account
Pearl argues that the arithmetical inferences in SP seem counter-intuitive only
because we commonly make two incompatible assumptions, that causal relation-
ships are governed by the laws of probability and that causal relationships are
more stable than probabilistic relationships [9, pp. 180, 25]. Once we reject ei-
ther of these assumptions, and he opts for rejecting the first, the “paradox” is no
longer paradoxical. On the other hand, when we fail to distinguish causal from
statistical hypotheses, the paradox results.
Pearl makes two basic points. One, SP is to be understood in causal terms
for its correct diagnosis. In the type I version, for example, the effect on “accep-
tance” (A) of the explanatory variable, “gender” (G), is hopelessly mixed up (or
“confounded”) with the effects on A of the other variable, “department” (D).
We are interested in the direct effect of G on A and not an indirect effect by
way of another variable like D. His other point is that causal hypotheses, which
support counterfactuals, often cannot be analyzed in statistical terms. Suppose
we would like to know Bill Clinton’s place in US history had he not met Monica
Lewinsky. The counterfactual for the causal hypothesis is “Clinton’s status in
the US history would be different had he not met Monica Lewinsky” [9, p. 34].
However, there is no statistical model one could construct that would provide
the joint occurrence of ‘Clinton’ and ‘no Lewinsky’. There simply are no appro-
priate data, as there are, for instance, in the fair coin-flipping experiments where
the model about flipping a coin and data about it are well known.
3.2 SGS Account
Spirtes, Glymour, and Scheines suggest a subject-matter-neutral automated
causal inference engine that provides causal relationships among variables from
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observational data using information about their probabilistic correlations and
assumptions about their causal structure. These assumptions are: 1. Causal
Markov Condition (CMC), 2. Faithfulness Condition (FC) and 3. Causal Suf-
ficiency Condition (CSC). According to CMC, a variable X is independent of
every other variable (except X’s effects) conditional on all of its direct causes. A
is a direct cause of X if A exerts a causal influence on X that is not mediated
by any other variables in a given graph. The FC says that all the conditional
independencies in the graph are only implied by CMC, while CSC states that
all common causes of measured variables are explicitly included in the model.
Since these theorists are interested in teasing out reliable causal relationships
from data, they would like to make sure that those probability distributions are
faithful in representing causal relations in them.
One reason for SP being causal, according to this account, is that (for the
example given in Table 1) applying to the school has a causal dimension in-
volving causal dependencies between “gender” and “acceptance rate”. More fe-
male students chose to apply to the departments where rates of acceptance are
significantly lower, causing their overall rates of acceptance to be lower in the
combined population. Similarly, with regard to Simpson’s own example in the
literature, Spirtes et al. write, “[t]he question is what causal dependencies can
produce such a table, and that question is properly known as “Simpson’s para-
dox”.” [15, p. 40].
4 Counter-Example to the Causal Account
It is not easy to come up with an example which precludes invoking some sort of
appeal to “causal intuitions” with regard to SP. But what follows is, we think,
such a case. It tests in a crucial way the persuasiveness of the causal accounts.8




Bag 1 Bag 2
Rates of red
Marbles Overall rates for
red marbles
Red Blue Red Blue Bag 1 Bag 2
Big
marbles
180 20 100 200 90% 33% 56%
Small
Marbles
480 120 10 90 80% 10% 70%
Suppose, as in Table 5, we have two bags of marbles, all of which are either big or
small, and red or blue. Suppose in each bag, the proportion of big marbles that
are red is greater than the portion of small marbles that are red (Bag 1: 90% >
80% and Bag 2: 33% > 10%). Now suppose we pour all the marbles from both
bags into a box. Would we expect the portion of big marbles in the box that
are red to be greater than the portion of small marbles in the box that are red?
Most of us would be surprised to find that our usual expectation is incorrect.
8 This counter-example is due to John G. Bennett.
66 P.S. Bandyopadhyay et al.
The big marbles in the first bag have a higher ratio of red to blue marbles than
do the small marbles; the same is true about the ratio in the second bag. But
considering all the marbles together, the small marbles have a higher ratio of
reds to blues than the big marbles do (in the combined bag: 70% > 56%).
We argue that this marble example is a case of SP since it has the same math-
ematical structure as the type I version of SP. There are no causal assumptions
made in this example, no possible causal “confounding” and yet it seems para-
doxical. We believe this counter-example shows that at least sometimes, there is
a purely mathematical mistake about ratios that people customarily make. Some
causal theorists might be tempted to contend that even in this example there is
confounding between the effects of the marble size on the color with the effects
of the bag on the color. However, this confounding is not a causal confounding
since one cannot say that Bag 1 has caused big marbles to become more likely
to be red or that Bag 2 has caused big marbles to become more likely to be
blue. In short, one must admit that the above counter-example does not involve
causal intuitions, yet it is still a case of SP.
5 “What-To-Do” Question and Causal Accounts
In the case of SP, “what-to-do” questions arise when investigators are confronted
with choosing between two conflicting statistics. For example, in Table 1, the
conflict is between the uncombined statistics of the two departments and their
combined statistics. Which one should they use to act? It is evident that many
interesting cases of choosing actions arise when we infer causes/patterns from
proportions. The standard examples9 deal with cases in which “what-to-do”
questions become preeminent. But it should be clear in what follows that there
is no unique response to this sort of question for all cases of the paradox. Consider
Table 6 based on data about 80 patients. 40 patients were given the treatment,
T, and 40 assigned to a control, ∼T. Patients either recovered, R, or didn’t
recover, ∼R. There were two types of patients, males (M) and females (∼M).






R ∼R R ∼R M ∼M
T 18 12 2 8 60% 20% 50%
∼T 7 3 9 21 70% 30% 40%
One would think that treatment is preferable to control in the combined
statistics, whereas, given the statistics of the sub-population, one gathers the
impression that control is better for both men and women. Given a person of
unknown gender, would one recommend the control? The standard response is
clear: control is better for a person of unknown gender (since Pr(R| ∼T) >
9 These recommendations are standard because they are agreed upon by philosophers
[8], statisticians, and computer scientists [9].
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Pr(R|T)). Call this first example ‘the medical example’. In the second example,
call it ‘the agricultural example’, we are asked to consider the same data, but
now T and ∼T are replaced by the varieties of plants (white [W] or black variety
[∼W]), R and ∼R by the yield (high [Y] or low yield [∼Y]) and M and ∼M by
the height of plants (tall [T] or short [∼T]).







RatesY ∼Y Y ∼Y T ∼T
W 18 12 2 8 60% 20% 50%
∼W 7 3 9 21 70% 30% 40%
Given this new interpretation, the overall yield rate suggests that planting
the white variety is preferable since it is 10% better overall, although the white
variety is 10% worse among both tall and short plants (sub-population statistics).
Which statistics should one follow in choosing between which varieties to plant in
the future? The standard recommendation is to take the combined statistics and
thus recommend the white variety for planting (since Pr(Y|W) > Pr(Y|∼W)),
which is in stark contrast with the recommendation given in the medical example.
In short, both medical and agricultural examples provide varying responses to the
“what-to-do” question. There is no unique response regarding which statistics,
subpopulation or whole, to follow in every case of SP. We agree with standard
recommendations with a proviso, i.e., we need to use substantial background
information, which is largely causal in nature, to answer “what-to-do” questions,
as doing something means causing something to happen.
6 Truths about SP: An Evaluation of Causal Accounts
We argued that to understand the significance of SP as a whole, we need to
distinguish three types of questions (first-level truth) as well as divorce the first
two questions from the third to show that causality is irrelevant both in unlocking
the paradoxical nature of SP and providing conditions for its emergence (second-
level truth). Based on our discussion of the causal accounts, one realizes that
causal theorists have in fact addressed the “what-to-do” question. We don’t
deny that causal inference plays a crucial role in choosing the right statistic when
confronted with the paradox. Hence we agree with both Pearl and SGS about the
third question. However, as far as we know, SGS have not distinguished the three
questions about SP, and thereby failed to appreciate the first-level truth about
SP. Pearl on the other hand, does distinguish the three questions. But both
causal accounts fail to understand the second-level truth about the paradox.
Notice that one may, like Pearl, recognize the first-level truth and yet fail to
recognize the second-level truth. An examination of his responses to the first
two questions will reveal the reason behind this, showing how his causal account
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falls short of providing an adequate explanation for the first two questions and
thereby not being able to appreciate the full significance of SP.
In response to the first question, Pearl draws attention to the distinction
between what he calls “Simpson’s reversal”, which is merely an “arithmetic
phenomenon in the calculus of proportions” and “Simpson’s paradox” which is
“a psychological phenomenon that evokes surprise and disbelief” [10, p. 9]. He
thinks that the latter is the result of intuitions guided by causal considerations
and the fallacy of equating correlation with causation. While agreeing with him
about the fallacy, we pointed out, with the help of the marble counter-example,
that fundamentally, SP is devoid of any causal intuitions, although most day-to-
day examples of SP can be interpreted causally. We think that human puzzlement
about SP stems from the unexpected failure of CP which closely resembles valid
inference rules (section 2.2). With respect to the second question, Pearl identifies
“scenarios” in which one can expect a reversal. A scenario, according to him,
is “a process by which data is generated” [10, p. 10]. The causal calculus/models
which represent these causal scenarios are different from our formal conditions
which have been derived from the structure of the paradox (section 2.1). So our
conditions capture all cases of SP regardless of the causal process involved and
provide a more general account than either of the causal accounts.
7 Re-evaluating the Place of SP in Paradox Literature
Logicians tend to hold different views concerning what paradoxes are. Whether
SP is a paradox depends on how one defines and slices paradoxes. Priest [11],
for example, may not consider SP to be a paradox as it is neither a set-theoretic
paradox such as Russell’s nor a semantic one like the Liar Paradox. But, under
Sainsbury’s construal, SP could be regarded as a paradox since he understands
a paradox as “an apparently unacceptable conclusion derived by apparently ac-
ceptable reasoning from apparently acceptable premises.” [14, p. 1]. However,
this might not furnish a genuine rationale for what makes paradoxes paradoxical
since one might worry what an “apparently acceptable reasoning” is. In this re-
gard, we find a better explanation in W.V.Quine, who both defines and provides
a general rationale for the apparently paradoxical nature of paradoxes. A para-
dox, according to him, is “just any conclusion that at first sounds absurd but
that has an argument to sustain it” [12, p. 1]. SP can be treated as a paradox
in this Quinean sense.
Two points are to be noted here. First, Quine’s use of the word “absurd”
could be ambiguous since it lends itself to two interpretations: a) psychological
confusion and b) logical contradiction. Our analysis of SP suggests that SP
“sounds absurd” under both interpretations. Given the logical reconstruction of
SP (section 2.2), we see how it leads to a self-contradictory conclusion. And,
given our response to question (i), we find that people tend to apply CP across
the board and their psychological confusion results when they find out that
CP, in fact, cannot be so applied. Second, our research shows that the sharp
distinction Quine draws between “veridical paradox” and “falsidical paradox”
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does not necessarily hold about SP. Distinguishing between these two varieties
while justifying each, he writes, “[a] veridical paradox packs a surprise, but the
surprise quickly dissipates itself as we ponder the proof. A falsidical paradox
packs a surprise, but it is seen as a false alarm when we solve the underlying
fallacy.” [12, p. 9, emphasis is ours]. He argues that Gödel’s discovery and other
paradoxes in set theory are veridical paradoxes. We think that SP can be seen
as a case of veridical paradox as soon as we realize that the population data in
all tables follow necessarily from the sub-population data along with the proofs
we provided for the paradox to hold. To explore whether SP could fall under
the category of a falsidical paradox, consider Quine’s own example of the latter.
According to him, paradoxes of Zeno are instances of falsidical paradoxes since
they rest on the fallacious assumption that “an infinite succession of intervals
must add up to an infinite interval.” Once we note this, it becomes clear that
the initial surprise about them was unwarranted. The same reasoning can be
offered for SP being a falsidical paradox. Our analysis shows that the surprise
SP packs rests on holding the dubious assumption that CP is unconditionally
applicable. Once we realize this, the paradoxical nature of SP disappears. So,
the unique feature of SP is that it is a paradox in both veridical and falsidical
senses. Therefore, there need not be a sharp distinction between these two types
of paradoxes as Quine once argued.
Two issues emerge from the preceding discussion. First, we rely on Quine’s
definition of a paradox and how it fares with regard to SP; As we will see in
a moment Roy Sorensen thinks that Quine’s definition is flawed as, according
to him, it is neither necessary nor sufficient [13]. Second, whether it is possible
to advance a definition of a paradox which could include all types of paradoxes
including SP and the Liar paradox under its banner. The rest of this section will
be devoted to addressing these two issues.
Sorensen’s method is to turn the definition of a paradox against what he takes
to be Quine’s own “paradox” of radical translation. Quine sets out his “paradox”
by first assuming the possibility of a “radical translation” situation, in which nei-
ther speaker knows a word of the other’s language. Consider a group of linguists
interested in understanding what the native speakers’ utterances mean. Suppose
the speakers utter “gavagai.” The linguists observe the speakers, hear what they
utter, observe the conditions under which they utter a word or sentence, and de-
termine what they are looking at or pointing out when they utter. Armed with
such information, let’s assume these linguists make a hypothesis that “gavagai”
means “rabbit”. In the same way, it is possible that another group of linguists
having the same evidence as the first group translates “gavagai” as “undetached
rabbit part.” Which one is the correct translation of “gavagai”? Based on this
thought experiment, Quine contends that radical translation is not possible as
meaning, here understood as referent, is indeterminate or at least undermined
by the totality of empirical evidence that is available. There is no way to know
whether the translation of “gavagai” as “rabbit” or “undetached rabbit part”
is the correct hypothesis. But the conclusion seems absurd; at least most of the
time, we know what others in our language group (or outside it) are referring
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to when they utter sounds. Sorensen rejects Quine’s construal of paradoxes by
pointing out that, “ ‘What is the translation of ‘Gavagai’?’ has infinitely many
rival answers. According to Quine, the problem is that infinitely many of these
are equally good answers. Quine’s paradox of radical translation is a counterex-
ample to his own definition of paradox. In addition to showing that absurdity is
inessential to paradox, the paradox of radical translation shows that the paradox
can be free of arguments and conclusions. ‘What is the translation of ‘Gavagai’?’
has answers obtained by translation, not conclusions derived by arguments.”[13,
p. 560].
Even though we agree with Sorensen that actual, in contrast to merely ap-
parent, absurdity is not necessary for understanding the nature of paradoxes, we
disagree with his claim that it is not helpful to construe paradoxes in terms of
an argument consisting of premises and a conclusion. What Sorensen misses in
his criticism of Quine is that while a paradox need not present itself in canonical
forms, their canonical forms are useful tools in understanding them, just as the
canonical form of an argument (with numbered premises and designated conclu-
sion) is a useful tool for discussing arguments that, in real life, do not always
present themselves in that way. To force the paradox into the canonical form,
suppressed premises must be revealed and hidden assumptions made explicit. If
the radical translation claims are paradoxical, they can be fitted into the canon-
ical forms, though there may be different ways to do that. Here’s one version in
our favored canonical form:
(1) A correct translation of one natural language into another is one that is
entirely compatible with all the facts about usage.
(2) If two translations translate a given term in one language into incompatible
terms in another language, one of the translations is not correct.
(3) There are two correct translations of the native language word“gavagai”
into English; one translates it as “rabbit” and the other translates it as
“undetached rabbit part.”
(4) “Rabbit” and “undetached rabbit part” are incompatible terms in English
(in the sense that they do not have the same referent).
(5) The native language and English are natural languages.
Contrary to Sorensen, we find that it is possible to exhibit the paradox of radi-
cal translation in terms of an argument with premises and a conclusion, revealing
the assumption on which it rests. At the same time, we agree with Sorensen in
a different way when he holds that a paradox need not have a genuinely absurd
conclusion. We tend to think that “sounding absurd” lends a psychological air
to the issue of a paradox. In light of these two considerations, we propose a
general definition of a paradox. A paradox is an (apparently) inconsistent set
of sentences each of which seems to be true.10 The word “apparently” in this
account, as in Quine’s, is to allow for cases that depend on fallacious arguments,
as in the well-known “proofs” for 1=2. Another advantage of this account is that
one might make several arguments from a set of inconsistent sentences, but one
10 We owe this definition to John G. Bennett. Lycan [7] has also provided a similar
definition.
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would probably not want to call them distinct paradoxes. Any paradox worth the
name, including SP, should obey this definition. Simplifying our reconstruction
of SP as a paradox in section 2.2, we provide a rough schema for SP with the
(optional) false premise marked by an asterisk, for the type 1 version of the
paradox.
(1) Sub-population 1 has a positive correlation between two variables.
(2) Sub-population 2 has a positive correlation between two variables.
(*3) If each sub-population in a partition of a larger population exhibits a posi-
tive correlation between two variables, then the population as a whole will
also exhibit that same positive correlation between the same two variables
(4) Overall population has a negative correlation between the same two vari-
ables.
If *3 is included, the set is inconsistent, since premise *3 is false. If *3 is not
included, the set seems to be inconsistent, but is not. Whether to analyze the
paradox one way or the other may depend on the example and the context. We
think that our definition is adequately general to include even the Liar paradox.
Call “this sentence is false” the liar sentence. The following provides a canonical
reconstruction of the Liar paradox with two premises and a conclusion.
(1) The liar sentence is true.
(2) The liar sentence is false.
(3) A sentence is either true or false, but not both.
In this section, among other issues, we both discussed and evaluated different
views on paradoxes. As a result, we are able to provide a general framework to
understand paradoxes while showing that both SP and the Liar paradox satisfy
it even though the former has an apparently contradictory conclusion while the
latter has a genuinely contradictory one.
8 Conclusion
Unraveling paradoxes is crucial to philosophers of logic as they challenge our
deeply held intuitions in a fundamental way. While addressing SP, we distin-
guished three types of questions. We showed that answering one does not nec-
essarily lead to the answers of the rest. Although, admittedly, the “what-to-do”
question is the most important insofar as the practical side of SP is concerned,
some causal theorists have overlooked the need to distinguish these three ques-
tions, thus failing to appreciate the first-level truth about the paradox. Even if
they recognize this first-level truth, the importance of the “what-to-do” question
drives them to assume that the causal calculus needed to address this question
is the correct way to unlock the riddle about the paradox. We, however, showed
that the truth about the paradoxical nature of SP and conditions for its emer-
gence need to be isolated from the “what-to-do” question. This failure on the
part of the causal theorists leads to their failure in appreciating the second-level
truth about the paradox. Pivoting on the question “why is SP paradoxical?”,
we provide a general framework for understanding any paradox. Our analysis of
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SP also highlights the significant role played by CP in generating the paradox-
ical result. Such principles are what Field would suggest we jettison to escape
paradoxes.
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Appendix11
For proving theorems 1 and 2 we firstly assume that the conditions of SP (arrived
at in section 2.1) are satisfied. That is,
C ≡ (C1&C2&C3)
θ = (A1 −B1) + (A2 −B2) + (β − α) > 0
Further, we stipulate the following definitions:
a = (members of A in partition 1)/(total members of A)
b = (members of B in partition 1)/(total members of B)
α = aA1 +A2(1 − a)
β = bB1 +B2(1− b)
A1, A2, B1 and B2 have the same meanings defined in section 2.1. We have
defined α and β differently than what we had done in section 2.1 only to ease
the proofs of the following theorems; otherwise the two sets of definitions are
mathematically equivalent. To take an example, in Table 1 (Type I SP), A1 =
180/200,A2 = 100/300, B1 = 480/600,B2 = 10/100, a = 200/500, b = 600/700.
Hence, α = (180/500) + (100/500) = 280/500 = 56% and β = (480/700) +
(10/700) = 490/700 = 70%.
Theorem 1. Simpson’s paradox results only if A1 = A2.
Proof: Let us assume that A1 = A2. Then, α = aA1 +A2(1− a) = aA1 +A2 −
aA2 = A1 = A2. Given this, there are three possible scenarios. (I) B1 > B2, or
(II) B1 < B2 or (III) B1 = B2.
(I) If B1 > B2, then [B1b+B1(1− b)] > [B1b+B2(1− b)]. Therefore, B1 > β.
Yet, if A1 ≥ B1, and α = A1, then α > β, which contradicts the assumption
that β ≥ α. Therefore, if A1 = A2, then it can’t be that B1 > B2.
(II) IfB1 < B2, then [B1b+B2(1−b) < [B2b+B2(1−b)] = B2. Therefore, β <
B2. Yet, A2 ≥ B2, A1 ≥ B2, and α ≥ B2 > β. This contradicts the assumption
that β ≥ α. Therefore, if A1 = A2, then it can’t be the case that B1 < B2.
(III) IfB1 = B2, then β = bB1+B2(1−b) = bB1+B1(1−b) = B1. Given that
A1 ≥ B1,A1 = α, andB1 = β, then α ≥ β. Yet, by assumption, β ≥ α. Therefore,
β = α. Since A1 = A2 = α, and B1 = B2 = β, it must be that A1 = B1, A2 = B2,
and α = β. That α = β contradicts the assumption that out case is paradoxical,
characterized by the reversal which we don’t find here. Therefore, if A1 = A2, it
can’t be the case thatB1 = B2. Therefore,A1 = A2.WithoutA1 = A2, Simpson’s
paradox cannot occur.
Theorem 2. Simpson’s paradox arises only if B1 = B2.
Proof: Let us assume thatB1 = B2. Then β = bB1+B2(1−b) = bB1+B1(1−b) =
B1 = B2. Given that A1 > A2, it is true that [aA1 +A2(1− a)] > [aA2 +A2(1−
a)]. Given that A1 > A2, it follows that [aA1 + A2(1 − a)] > [aA2 + A2(1 −
a)]. Therefore, α > A2. Yet, A2 ≥ B2 = β. So α > β, which contradicts the
assumption. Therefore, B1 = B2. Without B1 = B2, Simpson’s paradox cannot
occur.
11 We are indebted to Davin Nelson for the following proofs.
